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Abstract
Security incidents detected by organizations are escalating in both scale and
complexity. As a result, security incident response has become a critical mech-
anism for organizations in an effort to minimize the damage from security in-
cidents. The final phase within many security incident response approaches is
the feedback/follow-up phase. It is within this phase that an organization is
expected to use information collected during an investigation in order to learn
from an incident, improve its security incident response process and positively
impact the wider security environment. However, recent research and security
incident reports argue that organizations find it difficult to learn from incidents.
A contributing factor to this learning deficiency is that industry focused
security incident response approaches, typically, provide very little practical in-
formation about tools or techniques that can be used to extract lessons learned
from an investigation. As a result, organizations focus on improving technical
security controls and not examining or reassessing the effectiveness or efficiency
of internal policies and procedures. An additional hindrance, to encouraging
improvement assessments, is the absence of tools and/or techniques that orga-
nizations can implement to evaluate the impact of implemented enhancements
in the wider organization. Hence, this research investigates the integration of
lightweight agile retrospectives and meta-retrospectives, in a security incident
response process, to enhance feedback and/or follow-up efforts. The research
contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it presents an approach based on
lightweight retrospectives as a means of enhancing security incident response
follow-up efforts. Second, it presents an empirical evaluation of this lightweight
approach in a Fortune 500 Financial organization’s security incident response
team.
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1. Introduction
Information security incidents continue to escalate in today’s highly inte-
grated business environments. According to a recent survey, a quarter of all
businesses in the United Kingdom detected a security incident in the previous
twelve months (Klahr et al., 2016). The consequences of such incidents for an
organization can include significant financial losses, a loss of customer confi-
dence and a reduction in business reputation (Ponemon Institute, 2015). In an
effort to address information security incidents, many organizations have chosen
to create security incident response teams (Killcrece et al., 2003; Mitropoulos
et al., 2006). The objective of a security incident response team is to minimize
the damage from a security incident, and to allow an organization to ultimately
learn about the cause of the incident and how it can be prevented in the future
(Mitropoulos et al., 2006).
In the past decade, several security incident response processes and best
practice guidelines have been published in industry (Grance et al., 2004; Inter-
national Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical
Commission, 2011; Northcutt, 2001) and academia (Mitropoulos et al., 2006;
Prosise et al., 2003; Vangelos, 2011), defining how organizations can investigate
and manage a security incident. Typically, these incident response approaches
consist of six phases: preparation, which leads to the detection of an incident,
followed by its containment which, in turn, allows security incident response
teams to eradicate, recover and then, potentially, provide feedback information
into the next preparation stage. The final phase within many security incident
response approaches is the feedback/follow-up phase (Mitropoulos et al., 2006;
Northcutt, 2001). Information collected during an investigation is used in this
phase to learn wider lessons from the security incident, with the aim of prevent-
ing a reoccurrence of the incident (He, 2014; Mitropoulos et al., 2006). Incident
learning is usually accomplished through a series of formal reports, meetings and
presentations to management (Northcutt, 2001). Lessons learned can include
actions taken during the investigation, enhancing existing security controls and
identifying modifications to security incident response processes (Mitropoulos
et al., 2006).
Although security incident response approaches stress the importance of
incident learning, researchers have observed that many organizations find it
difficult to learn from security incidents (Ahmad et al., 2012; Shedden et al.,
2010, 2011). A contributing factor is that although many incident response
approaches incorporate a feedback/follow-up phase, these approaches provide
very little practical information about the tools or the techniques that can be
used to extract lessons learned from an investigation (He et al., 2014). As
a result, organizations tend to focus on improving technical controls and do
not reassess the effectiveness of internal policies and procedures, which could
also have contributed to the incident or obstructed investigative efforts (He
et al., 2014). Moreover, if an organization does extract lessons learned from
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an investigation, there is currently very limited tool or technique support for
organizations to evaluate if these enhancements have actually been implemented
in the wider organization (Grispos, 2016).
Retrospectives are an agile practice commonly used by software development
teams (Derby et al., 2006). The purpose of a retrospective is to provide a
lightweight approach to identify what worked and what did not work during
the previous development iteration and use this information to reflect on and
improve the processes used by the development team (Derby et al., 2006; Pham,
2011). In fact, previous research supports the idea that retrospectives can have
a positive effect on agile development processes improvement (Maham, 2008;
McHugh et al., 2012; Tiwari and Alikhan, 2011). This information prompted the
hypothesis that integrating lightweight agile retrospectives, in a security incident
response environment, will enhance feedback and/or follow-up efforts. In order
to address the hypothesis, the following research questions were identified:
1. What components of a retrospective need to be modified for use in security
incident response?
2. Do retrospectives assist with identifying and documenting additional in-
formation about a security investigation that, otherwise, may not be doc-
umented within a corresponding investigation record?
3. Do retrospectives assist a security incident response team in identifying
and documenting security controls?
4. Do retrospectives assist a security incident response team in identifying
and documenting security incident response-related process changes?
5. To what extent can a meta–retrospective highlight how many security con-
trols and security incident response-related process changes are actually
implemented within an organization?
Hence, this work investigates the impact of integrating lightweight agile ret-
rospectives into a security incident response environment with the aim of im-
plementing a process of on-going and incremental improvement. In addition
to implementing retrospectives in a security incident response environment, a
retrospective of retrospectives (hereafter referred to as a meta–retrospective)
was also implemented in the same environment. The purpose of the meta–
retrospective was to evaluate if any security controls and/or security incident
response-related process improvements, identified during a retrospective, were
actually implemented within an organization. The research contribution of this
paper is twofold. First, it presents an approach based on lightweight retro-
spectives as a means of enhancing security incident response follow-up efforts.
Second, it presents an empirical evaluation of this lightweight approach in a
Fortune 500 Financial organization’s security incident response team. The re-
sults of this evaluation indicate that it is a plausible solution for driving the
development of lessons learned in security incident response.
Highlights of the retrospective/meta-retrospective implementation in this
case study involving the Fortune 500 organization revealed:
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• In one hundred forty-eight (148) out of the three hundred and twenty-
four (324) retrospectives conducted, more information was revealed when
compared with the corresponding record of the actual investigation (see
Table 5 for further details). This indicates that more relevant information
is often available, which can be identified and documented through further
reflection and consideration.
• Security incident handlers in an organization need to communicate with
a wide range of individuals internally and externally (see Section 4.1 for
details). This finding suggests the importance of up-to-date contact lists,
alternative contact mechanisms (potentially out-of-band channels) and a
routinized way to document who was contacted and what was discussed
or decided.
• In twenty-five (25) out of the three hundred and twenty-four (324) retro-
spectives conducted, a single security control could have prevented a se-
curity event/incident from occurring. In four (4) other retrospectives, two
security controls could have prevented the security event/incident from
occurring. See Table 3 and associated discussion for further details.
• The retrospectives implementation also revealed that process changes were
required and, in certain cases, that completely new processes needed to be
developed to assist incident handlers investigating similar future security
events/incidents.
• Security incident handlers lost opportunities to investigate because rele-
vant data sources were not always preserved (for example, Lotus Notes
email, virtual machines) for a variety of reasons. This indicates a need for
improved communication and coordination when an incident occurs, and
for improved processes to ‘freeze’ relevant data sources.
• The meta-retrospectives implementation revealed that forty-two (42) out
of the sixty-five (65) potential improvements identified using the retrospec-
tives were implemented. However, the meta-retrospectives also identified
that fifteen (15) out of the sixty-five (65) recommendations could not be
made until they were escalated to senior management within the Informa-
tion Security unit. See Table 4 for more details.
• Six (6) out of the sixty-five (65) security control and process changes iden-
tified in the retrospectives resulted in ‘No Changes’ being made within the
organization. This is largely because the organization’s security incident
response team does not have authority over all the processes within the
organization.
Overall, those involved in the retrospective implementation perceived the
following benefits/advantages:
• That additional information was captured through the retrospectives, in-
cluding information regarding data sources, contact information, and pro-
cess changes/improvements.
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• The retrospectives helped to provide a ‘safety-net mechanism’ to help doc-
ument security control modifications. They also assisted with the identi-
fication of important stakeholders whose assistance could be required in
resolving investigations quicker and more effectively in the future.
• Provided a mechanism for incident handlers to identify and document
security incident response-related process improvements to help investiga-
tors in the future.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two discusses
relevant previous work and section three describes the research methodology.
Section four presents the data collected using the retrospectives and the meta–
retrospectives, along with an analysis of the results. Section five discusses
the implications of the research findings and section six draws conclusions and
presents future work.
2. Related Work
In today’s digitally integrated environment, it is understandable that orga-
nizations are examining different security incident response approaches, for the
purpose of formalization (Killcrece et al., 2003). As a result, a consensus as
to the standardization, effectiveness and efficiency of these approaches is yet to
emerge (Killcrece et al., 2003; Alberts et al., 2004; Wiik et al., 2005). While
numerous security incident response processes have been discussed in the lit-
erature, Hove et al. (2014) argue that many organizations find it difficult to
implement established security incident response processes. This is evident in
an analysis of empirical case studies conducted, in various organizations, which
have identified several problems and challenges with these approaches.
Grimes (2007) argued that traditional security incident response models have
become outdated and are no longer suited to manage today’s security incidents.
Werlinger et al. (2010), add that current security incident response tools do not
appropriately support the highly collaborative nature of security investigations
and that incident handlers often need to develop their own tools to perform spe-
cific tasks. Tan et al. (2003) explored the factors that influenced information
security managers to avoid conducting investigations subsequent to a security
incident. Tan et al. (2003) reported that their studied organization had no clear
definition for the term ‘security incident’. As a result, incident handlers did
not realize what security problems were actually ‘incidents’ and were slow to
react to real security incidents. Hove et al. (2014) studied three large organi-
zations with the purpose of investigating the plans and procedures for handling
security incidents within the studied organizations. Hove et al. (2014) identified
that although the organizations have plans and procedures in place, based on
industry best practices, many other procedures were missing from the studied
organizations. For example, in two of the organizations, security incident re-
porting procedures were not established while the other organization did not
appear to have enough staff to respond to incidents efficiently (Hove et al.,
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2014). Grispos et al. (2017b) investigated the ability for employees to identify
a security incident in technology–focused and non–technology–focused business
units within an organization. The results of this study indicated that there are
opportunities to improve security incident recognition and reporting within the
organization. These include focusing education initiatives on activities that will
provide employees with information on ‘what to do’ and ‘when to do it’ when
they identify or detect an incident and clarifying corporate policy with regard
to incident reporting (Grispos et al., 2017b).
Several researchers focused on how current approaches do not adequately
support security incident learning (Ahmad et al., 2012; Shedden et al., 2010,
2011; Tan et al., 2003; Jaatun et al., 2009). Ahmad et al. (2012) argue that
the ‘feedback’ phase is often skipped because security incident response teams
are too focused on containment, eradication, and recovery. In a study involving
the petroleum industry, Jaatun et al. (2009) explained that while learning from
security incidents was considered important, organizations found it difficult to
implement the concept in practice. Jaatun et al. (2009) go on to argue that or-
ganizations must be prepared for incident learning and this includes obtaining
managerial commitment and the willingness to commit resources to facilitate
learning from security incidents. This is a view that is shared by Tan et al.
(2003), who also noted that their studied organization was not prepared to
gather data or learn from security incidents. While the above researchers have
argued that organizations need to do more to effectively learn from a security
incident, Shedden et al. (2010) argue that current best practices and approaches
do not provide enough guidance and support as to how this can be achieved.
In another publication, Shedden et al. (2011) state that “researchers and prac-
titioners must accept that informal activities will occur below the surface in
security incident response”; hence, security incident response approaches should
be less formal and cater to informal learning approaches. The authors go on
to report that within their studied organization, incident handlers were under-
taking informal learning through conversation and observation. While Shedden
et al. (2011) propose that security incident learning should be informal within
organizations, very few informal tools have been proposed in the literature to
help organizations undertake security incident learning.
In order to address some of these problems, Grispos et al. (2014) proposed
the integration of agile principles into security incident response processes as
one solution to strengthening an organization’s security incident response pos-
ture. Grispos et al. (2014) argue that the agile principles, such as iterative and
incremental incident handling, reducing uncertainty, and continuous attention
to technical excellence could enhance real–world security incident response effi-
ciencies and effectiveness. Grispos et al. (2015) also proposed Security Incident
Response Criteria (SIRC) for the evaluation of security incident response tac-
tics being implemented in practice. Four of the criteria: dynamic stakeholder
involvement, multidisciplinary security incident response teams, short investi-
gation lifecycle times and incident learning throughout the incident lifecycle can
be closely aligned to agile practices and principles. From an industrial control
system perspective, He and Janicke (2015) discussed how security incident re-
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sponse processes might benefit from the integration of agile principles. He and
Janicke noted that future work should investigate mapping traditional incident
response processes to agile methodologies in order to determine which method-
ology would be more suited for security incident response (He and Janicke,
2015). A limitation of these proposals is that they do not investigate specific
agile practices in real-world incident scenarios.
The last principle within the Agile Manifesto proposes that “at regular inter-
vals, the team reflects on how to become more effective, then tunes and adjusts
its behavior accordingly” (Beck et al., 2001). The basis for this principle is
that no software development process is perfect and that agile development
teams will encounter new and unique situations whenever they take on software
projects (Shore, 2007). As a result, agile development teams are encouraged
to continually inspect, reflect and adapt their development processes to match
their changing environments (Maham, 2008; Shore, 2007). A common technique
used by agile development teams to achieve this objective is the retrospective
(Derby et al., 2006). Agile development teams will typically undertake a ret-
rospective at the end of the development iteration (Derby et al., 2006). The
purpose of the retrospective is to identify what ‘worked well’ and ‘what did not
work well’ during the most recent development iteration (Derby et al., 2006).
Development teams can also use retrospectives to determine if there is anything
they can learn from their experience that will improve the next iteration (Pham,
2011). Agile teams can also use retrospectives to understand the reasons behind
missed targets, finding ways to improve responses to customers and re-building
damaged relationships (Derby et al., 2006).
Several studies have examined the positive effect of retrospectives on agile
development teams (Maham, 2008; McHugh et al., 2012; Tiwari and Alikhan,
2011). Maham (2008) studied how a Scrum team performed retrospectives after
a three-week Sprint. The results from the study showed that the team members
highlighted what had worked well and what could be improved on from the
previous Sprint. Areas of improvement were then prioritized and implemented
in the next Sprint (Maham, 2008). Tiwari and Alikhan (2011) changed the
scope and method of retrospectives and decided to include customers in the
practice, instead of just the development team (Tiwari and Alikhan, 2011).
The perceived benefit of this modification was that it would provide customers
with an opportunity to hear first-hand about the team’s performance in the
previous iterations (Tiwari and Alikhan, 2011). Tiwari and Alikhan reported
that after a few retrospectives, the customers noted that they felt like they
were a part of the agile team and could contribute towards the development of
their product (Tiwari and Alikhan, 2011). McHugh et al. (2012) studied three
separate agile teams to examine if agile practices enhanced trust among team
members. All three teams agreed that retrospectives provided transparency and
visibility regarding the achievement of Sprint goals.
Multiple agile teams can often be working on the same product or project.
Often, each team will do their own retrospective and then look to conduct a
retrospective of retrospectives (Gonc¸alves and Linders, 2013). Gonc¸alves and
Linders (2013) describe a retrospective of retrospectives as a method of im-
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proving collaboration between the various agile teams. Retrospectives of retro-
spectives can also be viewed as a tool for sharing information between teams
(Gonc¸alves and Linders, 2013). While retrospectives and meta-retrospectives
have been used to inspect and adapt agile development processes, minimal re-
search has examined the integration of these two agile practices in a security
incident response context.
3. Research Methodology
In order to empirically evaluate the use of retrospectives as a method for en-
hancing the feedback/follow-up phase within security incident response, a case
study was conducted in Fortune 500 Financial organization. The case study
was completed between February 2014 and March 2015. The name of the orga-
nization is being withheld to ensure organizational anonymity. Therefore, the
names of organizational documents and processes have been altered and the
results of data collected in the organization are presented anonymously. Main-
taining organizational anonymity helps attain sensitive material, while creating
an environment that is conducive to the presentation of this information. The
case study utilizes a mixed method approach to the collection of data (Oates,
2005). The overall data flow and the data collection process executed in the
case study is illustrated in Figure 1 - Research Process.
Security Investigation ClosedSecurity 
Investigation 
Opened
Security 
Incident 
Reported
Conduct & 
Document  
Retrospective 
Conduct & 
Document Meta-
Retrospective 
Comparative 
Security & 
Retrospective 
Document 
Analysis
Follow-up 
Interviews
Stage 1 - Data Collection Stage 2 - Data 
Analysis
Stage 3 - Data 
Affirmation
Initial Activity
Figure 1: Research Process
The organization’s Information Security Incident Response (ISIR) team uses
a customized security incident response process. This process consists of four
phases: incident detection and reporting; recording, classification and assign-
ment; investigation and resolution; and incident closure. For the purposes of
this discussion, these activities are represented in Figure 1 as Security Incident
Reported, Security Investigation Opened and Security Investigation Closed. In
this environment, a Security Incident Handler (SIH) facilitates and coordinates
the organization’s response to a security incident. At the ‘incident closure’ stage
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of the process, SIHs are prompted to document findings obtained from a secu-
rity investigation in an investigation record, which is then stored in a database.
Documentation is typically done throughout the investigation, as well as at the
closure of the incident.
The first stage in the research process (Stage 1 – Data Collection) monitors
the security investigation record database, in order to identify and document
when an investigation record was closed by a SIH. The identification of a closed
investigation record prompts the second step in the first stage of the data col-
lection. This involves the primary author performing face-to-face retrospectives
with the SIH identified from the investigation record. A pragmatic decision
based on time constraints, data richness and potential data depth prompted the
use of questions as a method for conducting the retrospectives. The advantage of
using open-ended questions is that in-depth information can, potentially, be ob-
tained from participating individuals which encourages clustering and pattern
identification which is needed to identify improvement actions (Oates, 2005).
The questions used in the retrospectives with the SIHs were as follows:
1. Which information assets did you need to investigate in this security
event/incident?
2. Which information asset could you not investigate in this security event/
incident?
3. Who did you need to communicate with during this security event/ inci-
dent?
4. Who could you not communicate with during this security event/incident?
5. What security controls could have prevented the security event/incident
from occurring?
6. What process changes would assist investigating a similar security event/
incident in the future?
In this case study, responses to the retrospective questions were initially
recorded by hand and then digitally documented. Each retrospective lasted
approximately ten minutes and was conducted at the SIH’s desk. In software
development, retrospectives are typically held at the end of a development iter-
ation (Derby et al., 2006). However, unlike agile software development, where
work is broken down into iterations, security incident response investigations
generally stop at the end of an investigation (i.e. the end of the process life-
cycle) (Mitropoulos et al., 2006). Therefore, the retrospectives within a security
incident response lifecycle were undertaken at the end of each security inves-
tigation. It was anticipated that a retrospective would typically be conducted
within one–to–three days after the closure of an investigation record. In prac-
tice, approximately 92% of the retrospectives were held within this time frame
and the longest time between the closure of an investigation and a retrospective
was seven days.
The ISIR team was allotted four weeks to implement any security controls
and/or security incident response-related process changes identified in the retro-
spective. After this time period, the third step in the first stage of the data col-
lection process is to conduct a meta–retrospective. The meta–retrospectives are
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conducted to evaluate if the security controls and/or security incident response-
related process changes identified during the retrospectives were implemented
within the organization. The meta–retrospective consist of asking two questions:
1. Have the security controls you identified in the retrospective been imple-
mented? If No, why not?
2. Have the process changes you identified in the retrospective been made?
If No, why not?
A meta–retrospective was only undertaken when a SIH identified either a
security control and/or process change during the initial retrospective. Hence,
meta–retrospectives were undertaken with the same SIH involved in the initial
retrospective. Each meta-retrospective lasted approximately five minutes and
was conducted at the SIH’s desk. The SIH’s responses were initially recorded
by hand and then digitally documented.
The second stage of the research process (Stage 2 – Data Analysis) is a com-
parative document analysis (Oates, 2005). This analysis incorporates the retro-
spectives and the corresponding investigation records. The document analysis
aspect of this case study was conducted in March of 2015 and involved exam-
ining the answers from the retrospective questions with the information doc-
umented in the corresponding investigation record. The comparative analysis
involved examining all of the investigation records and retrospectives that were
undertaken in the organization. The purpose of the document analysis was to
determine if a particular retrospective identified more or less information when
compared to its associated investigation record.
At the conclusion of the document analysis, the third stage of the research
process (Stage 3 – Data Affirmation) uses semi–structured interviews to clarify
the impact that the retrospectives have on the organization. The interview in-
strument establishes the participant’s credentials and then proceeds to inquire
about what worked well, what did not work well, and process modifications. The
interview instrument in this case study consisted of both open-ended and closed
questions. To mitigate researcher bias in terms of reliability and viability, the
interview instrument was validated by two security professionals (Kitchenham
and Pfleeger, 2002). An information security manager and a senior security
analyst validated the instrument by taking the interview and providing feed-
back. The feedback from these individuals ranged from simplifying open-ended
questions to adding response options to closed questions. This validation was
only conducted once due to time constraints. Interviews were undertaken with
individuals who had participated in the retrospectives. In addition, the organi-
zation’s security incident response policy owner was also interviewed. Although
this individual did not participate in the retrospectives, he/she had an overview
of how the retrospective was implemented within the organization. The inter-
views were conducted at the participant’s desk within the organization. All
responses to the individual questions were initially recorded by hand and then
digitally recorded soon after the interview was completed, typically within an
hour. The results were then examined by hand to identify trends, patterns, and
anomalies.
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The scope of this research is limited from the following perspectives. This
research consists of a single case study in a Fortune 500 Financial organization
based in the United Kingdom. Hence, factors potentially impacting the case
study include international, national and local regulatory requirements, along
with societal and organizational cultural issues. It should also be noted that
the primary researcher was embedded in the organization for several months
along with being the primary data collector. Hence, the potential influence and
impact of the primary researcher has to be acknowledged.
4. Data Collection and Analysis
This section presents the results of the data collection from the implemen-
tation of the retrospectives and meta-retrospectives within the Fortune 500 Or-
ganization.
4.1. Retrospectives
Three hundred and twenty-four (324) retrospectives were conducted between
February 2014 and March 2015. All of the retrospectives were conducted with
six different Security Incident Handlers (SIHs). A summary of the data collected
using the retrospectives is presented in Table 1 and discussed in more detail
below.
Question Number Retrospective Data Total
1 Assets Investigated 502
2 Assets Not Investigated 22
3 Individuals/Groups Communicated 737
4 Individuals/Groups Not Communicated 5
5 Security Controls Identified 36
6 Process Changes Identified 29
Table 1: Retrospectives Summary
Question one was answered in all three hundred and twenty-four (324) ret-
rospectives. A total of five hundred and two (502) information assets were
identified in this question. For the purpose of this work, an information asset
is defined as any tangible or intangible system or data that has value to an
organization (International Organization for Standardization and International
Electrotechnical Commission, 2013). The collected data indicates that more
than half (280 assets) of the investigations involved the organization’s email as-
sets and associated logs. An example investigation from the email group could
perceivably be an inquiry into potential data leakage via the email service. Fur-
thermore, the SIHs also indicated that access to security-specific assets was
also needed in their investigation, with 162 such assets being involved these
investigations. The remaining assets identified through this question include
data repositories and databases (18 assets), network devices, servers and logs
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(15 assets), third-party assets (9 assets), organization-specific assets (7 assets),
desktops and laptops (6 assets) and Intranet/Internet-based assets (5 assets).
For question two, the SIHs indicated that there were eighteen (18) investi-
gations where they encountered problems investigating an asset or assets. The
answer provided in the remaining three hundred and six (306) retrospectives
was “none”. The SIHs indicated that they had encountered problems investi-
gating nine (9) individual information assets. In total, twenty-two (22) assets
were identified as not being investigated from eighteen (18) retrospectives, with
three (3) of these information assets identified in more than one (1) retrospec-
tive. Table 2 – Information Assets Not Investigated provides an overview of
the information assets, which the SIHs indicated during the retrospectives they
could not investigate along with the reason.
The table shows that SIHs could not investigate a variety of information
assets. These include virtual machines that have since been deactivated and
deleted, expired email accounts and missing email attachments due to expired
retention periods. One observation from Table 2 is that the ability to investigate
an asset is largely due to factors outside of the control of the SIHs. For example,
in nine (9) investigations the SIHs required access to a Lotus Notes mail file.
However, the retention period for these mail files had expired and was no longer
available for examination. It is also worth noting that in one retrospective,
one of the SIHs indicated that the reason why they could not investigate the
contents of the Windows Registry was due to limited tool access. This supports
previous findings that individuals within security incident response, often need
specialized tools and/or they have to develop their own tools to perform specific
exploratory tasks (Werlinger et al., 2010).
The third retrospective question was answered in all three hundred and
twenty-four (324) retrospectives. The SIHs indicated that, in addition to the
individuals affected by an incident and the individuals within the security in-
cident response team, they needed to communicate with fifty-five (55) differ-
ent individuals or teams during an investigation. In total, seven hundred and
thirty seven (737) names of individuals or teams were provided in response to
this question. The data collection from this question indicated that the SIHs
needed to communicate with individuals affected by a security incident, relevant
managers or team leaders in three hundred and twenty-three (323) investiga-
tions. Moreover, individuals within the Physical and Information Security unit
were required in one hundred and fifty-four (154) investigations, and individuals
within the Email and Information Technology (IT) Services unit in one hundred
and twenty-nine (129) investigations. In addition, the SIHs required the assis-
tance of external individuals, including third-party vendors, were required for
forty-two (42) investigations, legal and regulatory teams in fifty-eight (58) inves-
tigations, customer-facing units in twenty-one (21) investigations, and software
development/support units in ten (10) investigations. The results from this
retrospective question support previous findings that security incident response
teams often need to collaborate with a variety of individuals and organizational
teams during an investigation (Grispos et al., 2017a; Werlinger et al., 2007).
With regard to question four, the SIHs identified five scenarios where com-
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Information Asset Name Total Reason Provided
Deleted Email Messages 1 The Email Recovery Unit could
not recover the deleted emails
needed for the investigation.
Email Attachments 3 Email attachments that were re-
quired for the investigation were
no longer available because the
data retention period had ex-
pired.
Encrypted File Contents 4 The decryption key was no
longer available because the re-
tention period had expired.
Laptop Computer 1 The Security Incident Handler
was not requested to perform a
deeper analysis.
Email Account 1 The email account could no
longer be accessed as it was dis-
abled after the individual left the
organization.
Lotus Notes Mail File 9 Data retention period had ex-
pired at the time of the investi-
gation.
Organization-specific Asset 1 The system owner was not avail-
able during the course of the in-
vestigation.
Virtual Machines 1 The virtual machines were deac-
tivated and deleted before they
could be investigated.
Windows Registry Settings 1 A lack of available tools.
Total 22
Table 2: Information Assets Not Investigated
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munication was a problem during an investigation. A total of four individuals
were identified through this question, with one individual being identified twice.
In four retrospectives, the individuals were asset owners and their assistance
was required to gather data from the asset. In the fifth retrospective, an indi-
vidual’s assistance was required because he/she was a managerial figure for an
individual affected by an investigation. The communication problems were gen-
erally caused by outdated contact information (four investigations) and absent
individuals, away on vacation (one investigation).
With regard to question five, the SIHs indicated that in thirty (30) investi-
gations, security controls could have prevented the security event/incident from
occurring. In the remaining retrospectives, the SIHs indicated that no security
control could have prevented the incident (179 investigations) or the question
was not applicable (115 investigations). Thirty-six (36) security controls were
identified from the thirty (30) retrospectives. Within twenty-five (25) retro-
spectives, a single security control was identified, which could have prevented
the security problem, while in four (4) retrospectives, the SIHs indicated that
two (2) security controls would be required. In one (1) retrospective, three (3)
security controls were identified. The security controls identified by the SIHs,
in response to this retrospective question, have been mapped to eight out of
the fourteen relevant domains within the International Organization for Stan-
dardization/International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) 27002, Infor-
mation Security standard (International Organization for Standardization and
International Electrotechnical Commission, 2013). Table 3 – Security Controls
Identified, categorizes the number of controls identified using relevant domains
from the ISO/IEC standard.
The table shows that nineteen (19) out of the thirty-six (36) security con-
trols identified from question 5 are related to ‘Access Control’ and ‘Operations
Security’. This result reflects an opportunity for the organization to strengthen
security controls in these domains with the objective of preventing security in-
cidents in the future. The results also show a preference for restricting access
to assets through the enforcement of enhanced access controls.
Within question six, the SIHs identified twenty-nine (29) process changes
from twenty-eight (28) retrospectives. Within twenty-seven (27) retrospectives,
the SIHs identified a single process change. While in one (1) retrospective, two
(2) process changes were identified. The twenty-nine (29) process changes can
be categorized into one of four types. Four (4) of the process changes involved
the creation of a new process, while eleven (11) of the process changes involved
enhancing existing processes. Eight (8) of the process changes identified by the
SIHs involved the introduction of new tools and/or methods to assist the secu-
rity incident response team with future investigations. Six (6) process changes
involved modifications to existing processes owned by other teams within the
organization.
4.2. Meta-Retrospectives
Meta–retrospectives were initiated for forty-eight (48) out of the three hun-
dred and twenty-four (324) retrospectives undertaken within the organization
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ISO/IEC Domain Name Total Example Control
Access Control 9 Define administrative permis-
sions for virtual machines used in
test development servers
Asset Management 2 Check all hardware for CD media
prior to sending for recycling
Communications Security 1 Enhanced logging on Network
File System share
Cryptography 2 Transport Layer Security to be
implemented between organisa-
tion and third-party involved in
incident
Human Resources Security 4 Education re-enforcement sur-
rounding Secure Remote Access
Service tokens and PIN numbers
Information Security Policies 4 Creation of new lock-down stan-
dard for web server security
Operations Security 10 Block access to specific file-
upload portal on web gateway
Supplier Relationships 4 Third-party involved to imple-
ment technical and procedural
controls
Total Security Controls 36
Table 3: Security Controls Identified
between February 2014 and March 2015. These meta-retrospectives were used
to ‘follow-up’ on the implementation of sixty-five (65) security controls and/or
security incident response process changes identified during the initial retrospec-
tive. These security control and process changes are broken down as follows:
• Within twenty (20) retrospectives, the SIHs identified only a security con-
trol and no process changes. Twenty-three (23) security controls were
identified in these twenty (20) retrospectives.
• Within eighteen (18) retrospectives, the SIHs identified only a process
change and no security controls. Eighteen (18) process changes were iden-
tified in these eighteen (18) retrospectives.
• Within ten (10) retrospectives, the SIHs identified both a security control
and a process change. Thirteen (13) security controls and eleven (11)
process changes were identified in these ten (10) retrospectives.
Hence, the forty-eight (48) meta–retrospectives were conducted to investi-
gate if the security controls and process changes identified in the retrospectives
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had been implemented and, if not, determine why the change was not imple-
mented. The results from the meta–retrospectives inquiries are categorized in
the following manner:
• Change Made (CM) – the proposed security control or security incident
response-related process change was implemented within the organization
at the time of the meta-retrospective.
• Change On-going (CO) – the implementation of the proposed security
control or security incident response-related process change was on-going
at the time of the meta-retrospective.
• Change After meta-retrospective (CA) – the implementation of the
proposed security control or security incident response-related process
change was initiated during or after the meta-retrospective.
• Escalated to Management (EM) – the implementation of the proposed
security control or security incident response-related process change was
escalated to senior information security management for progression.
• No Changes (NC) – the proposed security control or security incident
response-related process change was not implemented.
Table 4 summarizes the results of the 48 meta–retrospectives. The figure
shows that forty-two (42) out of the sixty-five (65) security control and process
changes identified in the retrospectives were either implemented (Change Made)
in the organization or their implementation was considered ‘Change On-going’ at
the time of the meta-retrospective. Two (2) enhancements (one security control
and one process change) resulted in no changes being implemented at the time
of the meta-retrospective. However, in both these meta-retrospectives, the SIHs
started to take actions to implement these controls and changes shortly after the
meta-retrospective. One possible explanation is that the act of undertaking a
meta-retrospective may have prompted the SIHs to remember to take an action
with regards to the implementation of these enhancements.
Meta-retrospective Type CM CO CA EM NC Total
Only Security Control(s) 15 5 1 2 0 23
Only Process Change(s) 5 2 1 6 4 18
Combination 10 5 0 7 2 24
Total 30 12 2 15 6 65
Key: CM = Change Made; CO = Change On-Going; CA = Change After
Meta-Retrospective; EM = Escalated to Management; NC = No Changes.
Table 4: Summary of Meta-Retrospectives Results
The results from the meta-retrospectives also identified that a security inci-
dent response team can face numerous challenges when attempting to implement
16
security controls and process-related changes. During the meta-retrospectives,
the SIHs indicated that fifteen (15) out of the sixty-five (65) enhancements
had to be escalated (EM, in Table 4) to senior management within the Infor-
mation Security unit, who are responsible for operational security within the
organization. In all fifteen (15) cases, senior management either assisted in the
implementation of the proposed changes or continued to champion the changes
on behalf of the SIHs. This finding suggests that although an organization’s
security incident response team may have the responsibility to ensure that an
organization can learn from a security incident, the team may not necessarily
have the authority to change security controls to prevent a recurrence.
Similarly, not all security controls and process changes identified by a se-
curity incident response team will be implemented within an organization. Six
(6) out of the sixty-five (65) security control and process changes identified in
the retrospectives resulted in ‘No Changes’ (NC, in Table 4) being made within
the organization. However, in all six (6) cases, these retrospectives involved
process changes and not security controls. According to the SIHs, the primary
reason these changes were not made was because the security incident response
team does not have authority over all the processes within the organization.
As a result, if the SIHs propose changes to processes owned by other organi-
zational teams, it is dependent upon that particular team to decide whether it
will modify its process to satisfy the security incident response team’s requests.
For example, an SIH identified that enhanced logging for a web-based system
would assist with investigating the system. However, while the system’s owners
acknowledged the potential benefit, a business decision was made not to imple-
ment more detailed logs and the risk associated with this decision was accepted
by the organization.
4.3. Analysis
In order to determine if retrospectives can enhance feedback/follow-up ef-
forts during security incident response, quantitative data was collected from the
organization’s security incident response database. In addition, qualitative data
was collected through interviews with relevant individuals.
4.3.1. Investigation Record Analysis
At a high-level, the analysis of the retrospectives and investigation records
revealed that more ‘information items’ were identified using the retrospectives.
The term ‘information item’ is used in this context to describe an information
asset, individual, organizational team, security control or process change identi-
fied in either the retrospective or investigation record. The results of the analysis
show that one hundred forty-eight (148 (46%)) out of the three hundred and
twenty-four (324) retrospectives contained more information about an investi-
gation when compared with the corresponding record. One hundred and fifty-
one (151 (47%)) out of the three hundred and twenty-four (324) retrospectives
identified the same information as the relevant record. However, the analysis
also revealed that twenty-five (25 (7%)) of the investigation records contained
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more information than their corresponding retrospective. Table 5 – Investiga-
tion Records vs. Retrospective Data, presents a comparison of the ‘information
items’ identified from each retrospective question with the investigation record.
The table shows that five hundred and two (502) information assets were
identified using the retrospectives. In comparison, the corresponding investiga-
tion records contained information about four hundred and twenty-four (424)
information assets. Overall, sixty-five (65) retrospectives contained more infor-
mation about information assets required for a security investigation than what
was documented in the investigation records. Seventy-eight (78) additional in-
formation assets were identified from the sixty-five (65) retrospectives. More-
over, two hundred and fifty-nine (259) retrospectives and investigation records
contained the same assets.
With regards to information assets that could not be investigated, the in-
vestigation record analysis revealed that eleven (11) retrospectives contained
more information about the assets, which could not be investigated, than the
corresponding investigation records. Twenty-two (22) information assets were
identified during these eleven (11) retrospectives, while only eleven (11) assets
were documented in the investigation records. The analysis also revealed that
seven (7) retrospectives and investigation records contained the same informa-
tion about assets, which could not be investigated.
With regard to the individuals or teams required during a security investiga-
tion, the comparative analysis showed that eighty (80) retrospectives identified
more information about individuals and groups involved in an investigation,
when compared to the corresponding investigation record. Ninety-four (94)
individuals and groups were identified in these eighty (80) retrospectives. How-
ever, the comparative analysis also revealed that twenty-five (25) investigation
records contained more information about individuals and teams communicated
with, than the corresponding retrospective. Thirty-four (34) individuals and
groups were documented in the investigation records, but were not identified
using the retrospectives.
Regarding the fourth retrospective question, the comparative analysis re-
vealed that, in four (4) out of the five (5) retrospectives, more information
about individuals and groups, where communication was a problem, was iden-
tified by using the retrospectives than in the investigation records. In the fifth
instance, the information identified from the retrospective was also found in the
corresponding investigation record.
The comparative analysis of the security control information revealed that
eleven (11) security controls were documented within the investigation records,
while twenty-five (25) additional security controls were identified using the ret-
rospectives. Hence, more security controls were identified using the retrospec-
tives than the corresponding investigation record. Moreover, six (6) retrospec-
tives and investigation records contained the same security control. With re-
gards to security incident response-related process changes, the analysis showed
that while twenty-nine (29) changes were identified using the retrospectives,
only three (3) of these modifications were documented within the investigation
records. Therefore, twenty-six (26) additional process changes were identified
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using the retrospectives.
4.3.2. Interview Analysis
Seven individuals were interviewed and the answers are summarized below.
Initial questions established the participant’s current role, within both the or-
ganization and the security incident response team. Additional questions asked
participants about using retrospectives to identify ‘what worked well’, ‘what
did not work well’, along with security controls and security incident response-
related process changes.
Interviewee Demographics
Participants identified themselves as information security managers, senior
security analysts and security analysts. One individual was a trainee informa-
tion security analyst. These individuals assume various roles, which include
managers who enforce the organization’s security incident response process, as
well as analysts who manage security events and incidents. When the par-
ticipants were asked if they were involved in any post-investigation activities
within the organization, six out of the seven respondents indicated that they
were involved in various post-investigation activities. These activities included
improving and reviewing security policies and controls, analyzing security inci-
dent risk and escalating security recommendations to other stakeholders. Two
participants added that, in addition to these activities, retrospectives were also
a post-investigation activity. This result suggests that retrospectives have not
been completely recognized as a post-investigation activity, even though they
were undertaken at the completion of all the investigations during the case study.
Identifying ‘What Worked Well’
When the interviewees were asked about using the retrospectives to identify
‘what worked well’, the predominant answer was that this part of the retro-
spective helped to capture additional information that can be used to identify
frequency of asset use and stakeholder involvement. One individual added that
this part of the retrospective had helped to identify the individuals and teams
that the security incident response team must ensure are available to assist with
future investigations. The suggestion was that building stronger relationships
with these units would assist in resolving investigations quicker and more effec-
tively in the future. One information security manager also argued that this part
of the retrospective provided SIHs a second opportunity to document investiga-
tion information which may have been missed during the initial investigation.
When asked if there was a disadvantage to using the retrospective to identify
‘what worked well’, all seven respondents indicated there was no disadvantage.
In fact, all seven participants stated that this part of the retrospective provided
an additional avenue for the SIHs to identify and document information that
may otherwise not be documented. When asked about the overall impact of us-
ing the retrospectives to identify assets investigated and people with whom they
communicated with during an investigation, the respondents indicated that it
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could, potentially, enhance important asset information acquisition and identify
required investigation stakeholders.
Identifying ‘What Did Not Work Well’
When queried about using the retrospective to identify ‘what did not work
well’, five interviewees stated that this part of the retrospective has helped to
identify and capture information, which would otherwise not be documented.
One of the interviewees indicated that SIHs do not document information about
individuals they do not talk to or assets they cannot investigate, due to time
pressures. However, the individual went on to state that capturing this infor-
mation can help with identifying gaps in the process of obtaining access to key
information assets and stakeholders, which could be required for future inves-
tigations. All seven interviewees indicated that there were no disadvantages to
using a retrospective to identify information about ‘what did not work well’
during an investigation. When asked to discuss the overall impact of the ques-
tion ‘what did not work well’, the interviewees generally agreed that this part of
the retrospective has provided an opportunity for SIHs to stop and reflect about
‘what went wrong’ in the investigation and to document additional information.
Identifying Security Controls
When the interviewees were queried about using the retrospective to iden-
tify security controls that can be improved, they indicated that the retrospective
provided a ‘safety-net mechanism’ to help document security control modifica-
tions. One information security manager indicated that while this is a process
requirement, in reality, this does not always occur. These comments support
the results presented in Section 4.3.1, which indicated that security controls are
not always documented in the investigation record. When questioned further
on this matter, interviewees stated that this information was not documented
because of limited knowledge surrounding security controls. The interviewees
went on to acknowledge that while it is important to document this information,
their limited knowledge about security controls affected their capability to iden-
tify modifications. One interviewee suggested that this part of the retrospective
becomes a group activity. The idea was that individuals, within the incident
response team, have varied levels of security control knowledge and that collec-
tive input would be more affective at identifying improvements. This suggestion
emulates the Agile Manifesto, which encourages providing individuals with the
environment and support they need to reach specific objectives (Beck et al.,
2001). Similarly, undertaking a group retrospective could provide an incident
response team with the right environment to expand their knowledge and assist
with the identification of security controls.
Identifying Security Incident Response Process Changes
When asked about using the retrospective to identify security incident re-
sponse related process changes, the interviewees were unanimous that the ret-
rospectives assist with the identification of process changes. Two individuals
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indicated that this type of information was important to document, but the or-
ganization’s process did not require the security incident response team to doc-
ument this information. The two individuals went on to state that the process
of conducting a retrospective assisted with capturing this information, which
would otherwise not have been documented within the organization. One of the
information security managers added that they did not expect any security inci-
dent response-related process changes to be recorded in the investigation record.
This is because SIHs are likely to be more focused on eradicating and recover-
ing from security problems, rather than deciding on how to improve processes.
Hence, the manager stated that this part of the retrospective provided a mech-
anism that prompted SIHs to stop and think about how they can improve the
way they conduct security investigations, therefore, identifying and documenting
process modifications. Six out of the seven interviewees indicated that there was
no disadvantage to using the retrospectives to identify and document security
incident response-related process changes. However, one individual noted that
the activity was less important than identifying security controls and suggested
a monthly retrospective implementation targeting process changes.
Other Factors Influencing Retrospectives in Security Incident Response
Towards the conclusion of the follow-up interview, the participants were
talking about their opinion regarding other factors that have contributed to the
successful or unsuccessful attempt to use retrospectives within security incident
response. Five interviewees argued that a SIH’s knowledge of an organization’s
security controls and security incident response-related processes was a key fac-
tor in their inability to identify modifications. These individuals added that if
an SIH does not know about a specific security control or the existence of a par-
ticular process, it could be difficult to suggest improvements. Hence, educating
and training security incident response teams was considered a critical factor to
help SIHs identify modifications through retrospectives. Two individuals stated
that the success of a retrospective was also dependent on how quickly it was
undertaken at the closure of an investigation. These two individuals indicated
that the retrospectives should be undertaken swiftly at the conclusion of an in-
vestigation, however, both individuals concluded that this might not always be
feasible. This is because a security incident response team may have to manage
multiple investigations at any given time, and the priority will be to close the
investigation and move onto the next problem. As a result, retrospectives may
not be a priority when multiple incidents are affecting an organization. From a
managerial perspective, one of the information security managers argued that
security incident response teams needed to ‘buy-in’ into the idea of using retro-
spectives as a method for conducting follow-ups in security incident response.
The manager added that “a security incident response team, together with their
managers, need to want to improve and without the will to want to improve,
there is no point in undertaking the retrospectives”.
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5. Discussion
Responding to and learning from security incidents is a critical component
of the Fortune 500 Financial organization’s information security posture. Al-
though the organization’s security incident response team closely follows best
practice guidelines, the case study findings suggest that retrospectives can help
enhance how the team identifies security control and security incident response
process changes. However, the case study findings suggest that the retrospec-
tive implementation in the organization have also affected and been affected
by a process culture in the organization, can assist with the implementation of
best practices, and influenced information dissemination and security incident
learning.
5.1. Process Culture
The investigation record analysis revealed that more information was doc-
umented in the retrospectives regarding assets that could not be investigated
and individuals where communication was a problem. During the follow-up
interviews, one of the interviewees suggested that SIHs do not document this
information in the investigation record because of time pressures. However,
the individual went on to state that capturing this information could help with
identifying gaps in the security incident response process. These observations
provide an indication that a process culture exists within the organization and
that this type of culture influences the SIH’s ability to conduct follow-ups to
security incidents. Deal and Kennedy (2000) argue that a process culture is
very common in financial organizations and employees tend to focus on doing
tasks correctly according to a process. However, difficulties can arise because
of problems with systems and processes currently used in a process-driven or-
ganization (Deal and Kennedy, 2000). Within the Fortune 500 organization,
SIHs are expected to conduct thorough and conclusive security investigations.
However, the case study has highlighted that this is not always possible because
assets and/or individuals needed may be unavailable to the investigator. The
process challenges arise because the organization’s security incident response
process does not take into consideration deviations from ‘normal’ investigative
events. As a result, the process is expected to work all the time and does not
account for assets or individuals being unavailable. Even though the SIHs rec-
ognize that these resources may help them learn from an incident, without a
process deviation, assets may not be investigated and incident causes may not
be correctly identified.
Another problem with a process culture is the lack of immediate feedback
from processes implemented within an organization (Deal and Kennedy, 2000).
Consequently, employees do not actually know if the process is actually working
to achieve the particular objective (Deal and Kennedy, 2000). The case study
results suggest that retrospectives could be one solution to this problem. A
security incident response team could receive feedback about its incident re-
sponse process by implementing retrospectives at regular intervals to evaluate
if the process is achieving its objectives. Focusing the retrospectives on specific
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aspects of the process such as assets needed, individuals whose assistance was
required and security controls to prevent an incident reoccurrence means that
SIHs can identify if the process is working and improve those areas which are
not working correctly.
5.2. Assistance with Implementation of Best Practices
A commonly cited process for security incident response best practice is the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-
61 (Grispos, 2016). The purpose of this publication is to provide organizations
with guidance in establishing security incident response capabilities, in order to
handle incidents efficiently and effectively (Grance et al., 2004). The last phase
within the NIST process is the Post-Incident Activity phase. According to the
NIST guide, in this phase, an incident response team should hold a lessons
learned meeting to reflect on new threats and technology and to identify lessons
learned (Grance et al., 2004). The guide goes on to state that this meeting
provides an opportunity for an incident response team to review what occurred,
what was done to intervene and how well that intervention worked in the context
of the incident. However, apart from suggesting a meeting, the guide does not
provide any practical information on how these questions can be answered. The
lightweight retrospectives process could provide one solution to this problem.
As the case study results have shown, this lightweight process could be used
to drive post-incident meetings in order to collect information that will help
answer the the queries posed in the NIST guide.
5.3. Information Dissemination
While the case study results suggest that the retrospectives approach can
assist with the implementation of incident response best practices, the approach
could also be used to disseminate information learned from security incidents.
Researchers (Grispos et al., 2015; He and Johnson, 2012) have generally argued
that organizations find it difficult to disseminate information from security in-
cidents. These researchers go on to state that information that is learned from
a security incident investigation is usually not documented or often, when it is
documented, does not reach management to instigate change (He et al., 2014;
He and Johnson, 2012). In concert with these concerns, He et al. (2014) argue
that there is no systematic or standardized way to disseminate or manage in-
formation dissemination in security incident response. While a detailed report
could be produced for management, these individuals may find it difficult to
digest the information in the report because of the interrelated information it
will contain (He, 2014). Moreover, these reports are likely to be written for an
administrative purpose rather than ‘engineering purposes’ and, as a result, can
not be used to improve assets or processes affected by an incident (He and John-
son, 2012). The case study results suggest that retrospectives could provide an
alternative lightweight mechanism to support information dissemination, in se-
curity incident response, for engineering purposes. As the case study has shown,
the retrospective questions can be tailored to collect specific information that
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is useful to a security incident response team and its managers. This informa-
tion can provide insight into improving security controls and security incident
response-related processes.
5.4. Incident Learning
While the retrospectives could be used to improve information dissemina-
tion and feedback from a security incident response process, the information
collected using retrospective can also be used for wider organizational incident
learning. By extension, this can be considered one of the objectives of the case
study; additional information captured using the retrospectives can be used by a
security incident response team to learn about a security incident. Cooke defines
incident learning as “the collection of organizational capabilities that enable an
organization to extract useful information from incidents of all kinds and use
this information to improve organizational posture over time” (Cooke, 2003).
However, one observation made during the case study was that the organiza-
tion’s security incident response team did not frequently use this information for
the purpose of incident learning. Even though the team had this additional in-
formation at their disposal very few actions were taken to extend learning from
particular incidents. While further investigation is needed to determine why lim-
ited incident learning occurred using the retrospective information, managers
did use the same information for metric reporting to high-level management
to show organizational performance. Hence, based on Cooke’s definition, the
retrospectives information is being used by managers for incident learning.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
Undertaking a security investigation within organizations is an increasingly
challenging and complex task. The results from this research facilitated initial
answers to the proposed research questions. In reference to the first question,
the results identified two retrospective components that needed to be modified
for use within a security incident response process. First, unlike agile develop-
ment where retrospectives are undertaken throughout a software project, the
security incident response retrospectives were only conducted at the end of an
investigation. Second, the retrospectives conducted in a security incident re-
sponse process were undertaken with selective individuals and not the entire
security incident response team. Only the individuals who were involved in an
incident response participated in the retrospective.
In regard to the second research question, retrospectives assist with iden-
tifying and documenting additional information about a security investigation
which may, otherwise, not be documented within a corresponding investigation
record. The results from the comparative document analysis demonstrate that
retrospectives assist with identifying and documenting additional information
about a security investigation. One hundred and forty-eight (148) out of the
three hundred and twenty-four (324) retrospectives contained more information
than the corresponding investigation records. More specifically, the retrospec-
tives contained information about an additional seventy-eight (78) assets that
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were investigated; eleven (11) assets that were not investigated; ninety-four (94)
individuals or teams with whom the SIHs needed to communicate and four (4)
individuals or teams with whom the SIHs could not communicate during an
investigation. However, the analysis also showed that a retrospective is not a
replacement for investigation documentation. Twenty-five (25) security investi-
gation records were found to contain additional investigation information when
compared to the information identified using the retrospective.
Regarding the third research question, retrospectives assist a security inci-
dent response team to identify and document security controls. The analysis
has shown that twenty-five (25) additional security controls were identified and
documented using the retrospectives rather than the corresponding investiga-
tion records. In regard to the fourth research question, retrospectives assisted
a security incident response team in identifying and documenting security inci-
dent response-related process changes. The analysis has shown that twenty-six
(26) security incident response-related process changes were identified and doc-
umented using the retrospectives, but were not documented in the investigation
records.
With regards to the fifth research question, meta–retrospectives highlight
how many security controls and security incident response-related process mod-
ifications are implemented within an organization. The analysis from the meta–
retrospectives show that forty-two (42) out of the sixty-five (65) security control
and process changes were either implemented in the organization or their imple-
mentation was considered ‘on-going’ at the time of the meta-retrospective. Two
further adjustments were implemented after the specific meta-retrospective was
undertaken. In both of these cases, no changes were implemented prior to the
meta-retrospective and the changes within the organization were only instigated
during the meta-retrospective. In addition, the meta-retrospectives highlighted
that fifteen (15) out of the sixty-five (65) security control and process changes
had to be escalated to management. These managers then either assisted with
the implementation of the security control and process modification or con-
tinued to champion its implementation. Finally, six out of the sixty-five (65)
security control and process changes identified, in the retrospectives, resulted
in no changes within the organization.
Hence, the results from the experiment support the proposed hypothesis that
the implementation of lightweight agile retrospectives, in a security incident re-
sponse process, can enhance feedback and/or follow-up efforts. In addition, the
results from the experiment indicate that retrospectives can be used to enhance
the data collected during future security investigations. The data collected by
the retrospectives include assets investigated and not investigated; identifica-
tion of individuals and teams where there were communication issues; needed
security controls, and modifications to the security incident response process.
Improvements in these areas can potentially enhance overall investigation in-
formation, data capture from security controls, and influence modifications to
security incident response processes. While this lightweight retrospective ap-
proach was demonstrated in a Fortune 500 Organization, the method is, plau-
sibly, applicable to a range of organizations.
26
Future work will evaluate the research results on a much grander scale. The
experiment will be extended to investigate security incident response retrospec-
tives in a variety of organizations and industries. Other industries, of particular
interest, include highly regulated domains, such as healthcare and critical in-
frastructure environments. The research expansion allows for a comparison of
the financial organization’s results with the results from other industries and
organizations. Future research will explore additional agile practices such as
‘pair programming’ and ‘product backlogs’ to determine enhancement potential
in multiple environments.
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